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A large amount of empirical evidence accumulated over the years suggests that, com-
pared to the observed behaviour of actual taxpayers, the standard model by Alling-
ham/Sandmo (1972) predicts too high levels of tax evasion. In the context of their
model, the observed low evasion activity can be explained only with unreasonably high
Arrow-Pratt-measures of risk aversion.1 However, relatively low levels of tax evasion may
not be the result of risk-aversion at all. For instance, contributions from the realm of
economic psychology dating back (at least) as far as Schm¨ olders (1951) conjecture
that tax evasion will be the lower, the more satisﬁed the citizens are with the policy con-
ducted by their government.
In the present paper, we attempt to show that a low propensity to evade taxes can
be explained even for risk-neutral individuals by taking the considerations of economic
psychology seriously and integrating them – at least to a certain degree – into a modiﬁed
Allingham-Sandmo-model of tax evasion. The diﬀerence between the model presented
here and the theoretical approaches reviewed in Section 2 is constituted mainly by the
following two points: (i) we attempt to bridge the gap between the strictly neoclassical
literature on tax evasion and the literature from the realm of economic psychology by
integrating the concept of cognitive dissonance; (ii) we introduce the notion of informal
institutions and thus open the door for a little more far-reaching theoretical speculations
concerning the interdependency between tax evasion and the politico-economic process.
In Section 2 we give a more detailed account of this paper’s diﬀerences compared to and
common ground with the existing literature on tax evasion. Section 3 gives a short review
of the risk-neutral taxpayer in a pure portfolio-choice model. In Section 4, the notions
of cognitive dissonance and informal institutions are introduced and the optimal rate of
tax evasion for a risk-neutral individual with a conscience is derived and in Section 5 it is
shown how these results correspond to the politico-economic process and some possible
and plausible extensions are considered. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
1. This argument has been put forward by, among others, Alm, McClelland and Schulze (1992)
as well as by Graetz/Wilde (1985), Skinner/Slemrod (1985) and, for Swiss data, by Pom-
merehne/Frey (1992).
12. Links to the existing literature on tax evasion
There are mainly two strands of literature attempting to explain actual tax evasion
behaviour. On the one hand, we have models of mainstream neoclassiscal provenience
which include, somewhat arbitrarily, the phenomenon of tax morale in the taxpayer’s
calculus, but do not venture to explain why the otherwise uncompromisingly self-
interested homo economicus is plagued by moral considerations on the day he ﬁlls
out his tax declaration. The consideration of the taxpayer’s conscience has, however,
proven to be exceptionally fruitful in empirical research, where tax morale itself has
been made the dependent variable. For example, experimental research by Elffers et
al. (1987) has shown that the magnitude of tax evasion depends on the satisfaction of
the taxpayer with the tax system as well as the system of tax administration.2 Similar
experimental evidence has been brought forward in contributions reaching back as far as
Spicer/Becker (1980) and Thibaut et al. (1974). More recently, Alm, Jackson
and McKee (1992) found in an experimental setting that tax morale is more signiﬁcant
if taxpayers believe that there is a direct relationship between taxes paid and utility
gained from a public good. Baldry (1986) has shown in an experiment that some
people never evade taxes, seemingly paying no regard to expected utility considerations
whatsoever. Finally, Wahlund (1992) gives an exhaustive list of possible inﬂuences
on tax evasion behaviour based on survey data. Among these inﬂuences are a generally
negative attitude towards the tax system and the belief that the marginal tax rate is too
high.
There is also a considerable amount of non-experimental evidence, indicating that a rela-
tionship exists between the taxpayer’s satisfaction with his government in general or the
tax system in particular on the one hand, and the amount of taxes evaded on the other
hand. Frey (1997) has shown, that in those Swiss cantons where citizens have means
of direct democratic inﬂuence and control, tax evasion is signiﬁcantly lower. Similar re-
sults have been found by Pommerehne/Weck-Hannemann (1996) and Feld/Frey
2. See also Webley et al. (1988).
2(2001) have shown that if there is a relationship based on trust between the tax admin-
istration and the taxpayer, then evasion will tend to be lower. Kucher/G¨ otte (1998)
show by means of an empirical analysis for the city of Z¨ urich that tax morale was higher,
the higher the rate of concurrence between the people’s votes in referenda and the gov-
ernment’s recommendation to vote was – i.e., the more people have trusted the recom-
mendations given to them by their representatives. Finally, Graetz et al. (1986)
have found a decline in tax morale in US data on tax evasion.
So, it appears to be safe to say that there is something like tax morale, and that
it depends systematically on the institutional environment as well as on the policy
parameters chosen by the government. But this statement still does not answer the
question why the otherwise rational, self-interested taxpayer acts in a manner that leaves
the observer adhering to the assumption of homo economicus being in fact susceptible to
morality. There are relatively few theoretical approaches to this problem. For instance,
Pommerehne et al. (1994) formulate a simulation model in which they assume
that taxpayers follow a tit for tat strategy, so that “good” taxpayers, who initially do
not evade for moral reasons, start to evade taxes when they recognise that politicians
deviate from the citizens’ preferences. It is shown that in a direct democracy, with
fewer possibilities of deviation compared to a representative democracy, tax evasion
will be lower. Pommerehne et al. (1997) go a step further and try to explain why
taxpayers feel obliged to be honest. They assume that taxpayers who are included in the
decision-making process via direct democratic institutions gain utility by not breaking a
commitment in whose formulation they have participated. This explanation is, however,
limited to countries where collective decisions are made (at least partly) by following
direct democratic rules.
Gordon (1989) formulates a model of tax evasion in which he allows for an individual
honesty characteristic, representing the propensity to be honest which can vary from
individual to individual. This allows him to model interactions between taxpayers,
because the individual’s own honesty can be assumed to depend on the honesty of his
peers. Reactions to the government’s choice of policy parameters are not modelled.
Bordignon (1993) introduces a fairness constraint to a standard, portfolio choice
3model of tax evasion. This constraint, which is simply a maximum level of tax evasion,
is determined endogenously by assuming that individuals abide by a Kantian ethical
rule in determining the tax they consider fair and are willing to pay. Although this
modelling approach gives valuable insights by allowing for the interaction between
individual taxpayers and between the taxpayer and the government to play a role, it has
a shortcoming in not explaining why individuals adhere to the Kantian rule. Finally,
Erard/Feinstein (1994) have also integrated a variable accounting for psychological
costs, but have made no assumptions regarding this variable’s dependency on the policy
conducted by the government.
Reviewing these theoretical approaches, one might come to the idea that the matter
of tax morale is not a matter of morals at all, which would be a rather comforting
thought from the perspective of the economist, who generally believes that most if not
all important features of economic life can be explained by means of a marginalist rational
choice model. In the following sections, we will attempt to show that low tax evasion
activity can indeed be explained by employing a rather conventional model built around
an agent maximising expected income. We do attempt to bridge the gap to the literature
from the realm of economic psychology, however, by recognising the possible occurrence of
psychological costs to our taxpayer. Obviously, the consideration of psychological costs is
often regarded a little dubious among methodologists, because by using an unsystematic
concept of such costs, any theory can be protected from falsiﬁcation, but the price to pay
is a loss of predictive power.3 Therefore, psychological costs are most of the time not
considered in economic models for the same reasons that preferences are held constant.
We bear in mind these serious and well-founded methodological objections and attempt to
put forward some clear cut hypotheses on the occurrence of psychological costs associated
with tax evasion behaviour. Furthermore, it will be shown that this modiﬁcation of
the standard model leads to a considerable widening of the theoretical playing ﬁeld,
because various attributes of the politico-economic process can have a direct impact on
tax evasion. But ﬁrst, we will quickly review our theoretical yardstick in the following
3. See, for example, Kirchg¨ assner (2000), pp. 60-62.
4section: the risk-neutral tax evader in a pure portfolio-choice model in the Allingham-
Sandmo-tradition.
3. The standard risk-neutral tax evader
The tax evasion decision of a rational, self-interested, risk-neutral and completely con-
science-free evader can be modelled with a small number of simple equations. We assume
a simple, proportional income tax with a uniform rate t on gross income y, so that taxes
paid by a completely honest taxpayer would amount to T = ty. A less honest taxpayer
conceals a portion 0 ≤ τ ≤ 1 of his income, and this activity is detected by the tax
authorities with a probability 0 < p < 1. In case of being convicted, the evader has to
pay his regular taxes and in addition a penalty tax S = sτy. The penalty tax is to be
calculated by applying a penalty tax rate s to the total amount of concealed income.
Being risk-neutral, he maximises utility by maximising expected income, and he does
so by letting τ rise until the expected marginal gain in saved taxes equals the expected
marginal loss in expected punishment, which is the case when
(1 − p)ty = psy. (1)
In this formulation, tax evasion is an all-or-nothing decision. The taxpayer hides all his
income if the left has a bigger value than the right hand side of the equation, and he does
not evade at all if the right hand side assumes a higher value. We can change this by
making assumption that the penalty tax rate depends on the portion of income concealed.
It will be convenient to assume that
s = α
√
τ with α > 0 (2)
so that the marginal eﬀect of a rise of τ on s is positive but declining and, since τ ≤ 1,
the highest possible penalty tax rate is s = α. The penalty tax schedule assumed here
is obviously a simpliﬁcation, but it does not defy reality completely as, for instance,
the depiciton of german tax-related criminal law in Tipke/Lang (1996) shows. The
expected punishment is then
E[P] = pατ
1.5y (3)













Summing up, the magnitude of tax evasion will rise with t, but decline with a rise of p
and α. If we stop here, however, we would usually end up forecasting too high levels of
tax evasion, as the empirical evidence cited above indicates.
4. Rational tax evasion with psychological costs
4.1. Introducing: A taxpayer with a conscience. We will now embark upon our
eﬀort to allow for the taxpayer to have a conscience and to do so in a way that leads
to empirically testable rather than sterile, infalsiﬁable hypotheses. The ﬁrst step will be
to introduce the idea of cognitive dissonance, which can be traced back to Festinger
(1957). The basic concept is surprisingly simple: it is assumed that every individual is
endowed with a set of cognitions. A cognition is deﬁned as a normative or positive view
held by the individual about the world or about himself. For instance, “The government
is making eﬃcient use of public funds” is cognition A (a positive statement), “I as an
individual believe that progressive taxation is just, on the condition that A is true” is
cognition B (a normative statement) and “I have only recently transferred my taxable
income to a carribean tax haven, where the tax administration will certainly never ﬁnd it”
is cognition C (another positive statement). Obviously, there is a contradiction between
statement C and the other two statements A and B, but it is a contradiction that would
not bother a conscience-free homo economicus, since he is certain that his evasion of taxes
will not be discovered and he therefore has no reason to fear either legal punishment or
being socially ostracised.
Things appear diﬀerent when cognitive dissonance matters in his considerations on the
optimal level of tax evasion. Dissonance appears whenever an individual recognises that
two or more of his cognitions are contradictory. The psychological costs that occur to
6the individual because of dissonance imply an incentive to reduce dissonance, usually by
means of changing one of the dissonant cognitions. There are already several contributions
which attempt to utilise the concept of cognitive dissonance in an economic context. For
example, Akerlof/Dickens (1982) explain an ineﬃciently low demand for safety gear
by individuals employed in dangerous workplaces by showing that these individuals have
an incentive to disclaim the cognition that their workplace is indeed dangerous. Mayer
(1993) shows that policy decisions of american central bankers can be explained by
referring to the concept of cognitive dissonance. And Meier/Durrer (1992) show how
an entirely new approach to explaining economic policy making may be built around a
model of man that combines economic rationality and aspects of social cognition.4
Now, suppose that costlessly altering cognitions ex post is not feasible. This means
that, once the taxpayer has evaded taxes and once he has recognised that this activity
is dissonant with the other cognitions he holds, he will have to cope with psychological
costs. From an economist’s point of view, it seems plausible to assume that a rational
individual will be able to assess the magnitude of these costs ex ante, especially because
they depend on his own cognitions and his own attitudes. This is a central premise for the
following speculations, when we assume that psychological costs resulting from cognitive
dissonance are considered by the tax payer ex ante in the marginal calculus by which he
determines his optimal level of tax evasion.
4.2. The optimal level of tax evasion with cognitive dissonance. First of all,
a more precise assumption regarding the magnitude of psychological costs is required.
If we have another look at the three cognitions from the above paragraph, we see that
cognitive dissonance will be a problem only in the case when cognition A holds. Cognition
A can be formulated more broadly as the statement that the individual is satisﬁed with
his government’s taxing and spending decisions. Following the lead of the literature on
spatial preferences, it may be assumed that the taxpayer values public policy by means
4. See also Slembeck (1997) for an english summary of this approach. In a remotely similar approach,
Brady et al. (1995) show how government failure can be explained by employing the concept of
cognitive dissonance.








where x is a vector describing the actual policy executed by the government in the
policy space <N and x∗ is the ideal vector of an individual i.5 ∆B(·,·) is the euclidian
distance between two vectors, weighed with a matrix B whose elements bnn > 0 and
bnm = 0∀n 6= m indicate how important an individual considers one policy item to be
relative to the others.
Adding to the assumption of the existence of a personal ideal vector x∗, we also assume
that in the economy, there exist a number of informal institutions deﬁning a subset
I ⊆ <N of policy vectors that are generally regarded as fair and acceptable. The term
‘informal institutions’ has a number of diﬀerent connotations in the economic literature,
for instance as an obstacle to the eﬀectivity of formal institutions in transition processes6
or as norms internalised by individuals7. Here, we will follow Knight (1992) and assume
that informal institutions are simply self-enforcing rules which are not drafted formally.
The question of how the mechanism of self-enforcement exactly works will be tackled
later. It will be further assumed that U(xI) > U(x)∀x 6∈ I,xI ∈ I, which can, for
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This is illustrated in Fig. 1. It means that x• is the least valued policy vector in I and
x◦ is that policy vector in I, that has the smallest weighted distance to the actual policy
vector x.
Put into words, a policy that is in compliance with the informal institutions of a society
is always considered better than a policy that is not in compliance – even if a policy in
5. For notational simpliﬁcation, the suﬃx i will be omitted from now on.
6. See North (1992).







Figure 1: A graphic illustration of the taxpayer’s utility from public policy. Suppose
that x is the actual policy vector, x∗ the most preferred policy vector and the shaded area
represents I. The loss in utility compared to the ideal vector is then not simply given
by the weighted distance between x∗ and x, because in this case, a higher utility may be
associated with a vector x 6∈ I than with a vector x• ∈ I. To avoid this, we assume that
the utility of any x 6∈ I is given by the distance from x to the nearest x◦ ∈ I, substracted
from U(x•), with x• being the least valued vector in I.
compliance has a larger weighted distance to the personal ideal vector x∗ than a policy not
in compliance. The policies in I are all in accordance with the individuals’ shared notions
about which policy is still acceptable, even if it deviates from their own personal ideal
points. From (7), it follows logically that x∗ ∈ I. Note also that we simply assume that
there is one common informal institution shared by all individuals in our model economy
– an assumption that is obviously not always true in reality. So, the question of how
such informal institutions arise and what follows from conﬂicts between, for example,
two rival notions of an acceptable policy, are left open at this point, albeit these are
certainly interesting issues for future research.
Futhermore, it is assumed that only a loss of legitimacy resulting from a transgression
of the informal institutions can be utilised to reduce dissonance. Evading taxes is an
illegitimate act and, from the perspective of the taxpayer, it is only vindicable when
the government, as the antagonist in the tax evading game, chooses to execute a policy
that is also considered illegitimate. Legitimacy of a policy x from the perspective of any















A policy is completely legitimate (L = 1) when the weighted euclidian distance between
the actual policy and the nearest x◦ is zero. With a rising weighted distance, L → 0.
This allows us to also formulate a simple functional relationship for the costs emerging
from cognitive dissonance:
D = aτyL. (10)
When the legitimacy of the actual policy vector equals zero, there is no dissonance and
therefore, there are no dissonance costs. The parameter 0 < a < 1 stands for the
individual susceptibility to cognitive dissonance. The intuition behind this is as follows:
most individuals consider themselves to be acting on sound moral grounds, so that their
a will take a reasonably high value. But this is not necessarily true for everybody. If, for
instance, one has accepted and learned to enjoy cognition D, “I am a nasty scoundrel”,
then the contradiction between cognitions A, B and C will not bother him to any great
extent, so that he acts nearly like homo economicus without a conscience and a ≈ 0.
Finally, dissonance is assumed to depend on the absolute amount of taxable income
concealed, τy.
These dissonance costs can now easily be accounted for in the portfolio-choice model.
Remember that the expected punishment is E[P] = pατ1.5y, then the expected overall
costs of tax evasion amount to
E[C] = τy(pα
√
τ + aL). (11)
The objective of the taxpayer, therefore, is
max
0≤t≤1
τy[(1 − p)t − pα
√
τ − aL] (12)
with the f.o.c. being
(1 − p)ty − 1.5pαy
p
(τ) − aLy








as the optimal amount of tax evasion for an evader who suﬀers from positive dissonance
costs.8 Obviously, the propensity to evade taxes is lower here than in the pure portfolio-
choice model. For suﬃciently high values of a and/or L, we might even have a situation
as with c3, where no taxes are evaded at all. This leads us to
Proposition 1. With a decline in legitimacy of the actual policy vector x, the taxpayer’s
propensity to evade taxes rises, but never above the level predicted in the standard
portfolio-choice model. With a rise of legitimacy, on the other hand, the propensity to
evade is reduced, possibly even so far that aL > (1 − p)t holds for very large t, so that
no evasion occurs at all.
Proposition 1 can be supplemented with
Proposition 2. The impact of a rise (decline) in legitimacy on τ will be larger the higher
the value of a.
This is illustrated in Fig. 2: The more susceptible individuals are to cognitive dissonance,
the greater will be the eﬀect of a change of legitimacy. In each case, the lowest curve is
calculated for L = 0, the highest for L = 1, with an interval of ∆L = 0.1 between each




= ¯ t (15)
τ can be downwards-sloping in t, which, at least in the model as formulated here, does
not make too much sense economically. This is, however, quite easy to explain, because
in this case the marginal psychological costs alone have a greater value than the expected
marginal gain from tax evasion, so that it makes perfect sense to say that no tax evasion
does occur at all if t < ¯ t. From (15), we can also infer
8. Note that with −0.75pα 1 √
τ < 0 for given ranges of parameter values, the s.o.c. for a maximum is
also met.
11Proposition 3. If the legitimacy of the actual policy vector is positive, then tax evasion
takes place only at a tax rate t > ¯ t > 0. If L = 0, then evasion takes place at any rate
t > 0.
Obviously, we can also hold the tax rate constant in (15) and ask how far legitimacy has
to decline to reduce dissonance far enough to make tax evasion an interesting option for
the taxpayer. In answering this question, we come to





This means that, starting from L = 1, the decline in legitimacy that is just enough to
prompt tax evasion activity has to be the lower, the smaller the value of p and a and the
higher the tax rate t. It also means that, if (1 − p)t > a, all the scruples of the taxpayer
cease to matter for the starting point of tax evasion, in terms of L.
a=0, 5 a=0, 9 a=0, 1
Figure 2: Changes of legitimacy with diﬀerent values for a.
4.3. A more general case: legitimacy depends on the tax rate. Contrary to what
was implicitly assumed in the above subsection, L will usually itself depend on the tax
rate t. Suppose that all N − 1 policy-issues are in line with the corresponding informal
institutions and that the Nth issue is the tax rate. Suppose further that the informal rule
12related to the tax rate demands that t ≤ t∗. Then we can reformulate (9) as
L =

    
    
1 ∀t ≤ t∗
1 − (t − t∗)bt ∀t∗ < t < 1
b + t∗




b + t∗ being the value for t where (t − t∗)b = 1. Substituting this into (14) we can
determine the magnitude of tax evasion by
τ =

              
              
0 ∀t ≤ ¯ t

(1 − p)t − a
1.5pα
2
∀t ≤ t∗ ∧ t > ¯ t ∧ [·] ≤ 1

(1 − p)t − a(1 − b(t − t∗))
1.5pα
2
∀t∗ < t ≤ 1






b + t∗ ∧ t > ¯ t ∧ [·] ≤ 1
1 ∀t > ¯ t ∧ [·] > 1
. (17a-e)
Departing from here, we can now also make a conjecture on where tax evasion will start
when legitimacy depends on the tax rate chosen. We have to distinguish two seperate
cases. In the ﬁrst case, suppose that government decides to choose a tax rate that is in
compliance with the informal institution. Then from (17b) we can infer that tax evasion
starts at a tax rate ¯ t = a
1−p. Thus, if the taxpayer’s susceptibility to cognitive dissonance
is suﬃciently low, or the probability of detection is suﬃciently small, so that a < t∗(1−p)
and therefore ¯ t < t∗, then tax evasion starts even if the government chooses a tax rate
¯ t < t < t∗ and informal institutions are not transgressed. Now suppose that, in the second
case, government decides to pick a tax rate not in compliance with the informal rule, so
that t > t∗. Note that as long as t ≤ t∗, the starting point of tax evasion is always
determined by ¯ tL=1 = a
1−p. Note also that ¯ tL=1 as well as ¯ tL<1 = a+abt∗
1−p+ab (for t > t∗,
folowing from (17c)) predict t∗ to be the starting point of tax evasion if a = t∗(1 − p).
Keeping this in mind, we can state
Proposition 5. If a < t∗(1 − p), then tax evasion always starts even before legitimacy
is lost, i.e., even with t < t∗. If a ≥ t∗(1 − p), then tax evasion always starts at a tax
13rate t > ¯ tL<1 ≥ t∗. With a rise of b, ¯ tL<1 declines and converges towards t∗ and with a
decline in b, ¯ tL<1 rises and converges towards ¯ tL=1 = a
1−p.
The claim of convergence in Proposition 5 follows from lim
b→∞
tE





1−p. Intuitively speaking, this means that with a growing weight attached to the matter
of being taxed at a rate of t∗ or lower and with a > t∗(1 − p), the starting point of tax
evasion will decline towards t∗ – individuals can reduce cognitive dissonance resulting
from tax evasion more easily, if the violated informal rule is considered important. If, on
the other hand, this rule is considered to be utterly unimportant so that b ≈ 0, then this
rule’s violation does not help to reduce dissonance at all. In this case, the starting point
of tax evasion will again be determined solely by the conscience parameter a and by the
probability of detection.9
So far, we have only investigated the tax rate where tax evasion sets in. In this sense, tax
morale appears as the habit of taxpayers to evade taxes not at any tax rate t > 0, but
only at a tax rate t > ¯ t > 0, where the expected marginal gain from tax evasion outweighs
the expected marginal dissonance costs. However, the magnitude of tax evasion, τ, will
also be of considerable interest. Once tax evasion sets in (i.e. for tax rates t > ¯ t)10,
the dissonance model in (17) yields non-ambiguous comparative statics for the policy
parameters t, p and α similar to the conscience-free individual in (5): ∂τ
∂t > 0, ∂τ
∂p < 0
and ∂τ
∂α < 0. Having a closer look at (17), we also see that what is commonly called tax
morale becomes visible as the psychological costs of tax evasion, and it is obvious that
tax morale also has an impact on the magnitude of tax evasion.
With L = 1 in (17b), the taxpayer has no means of reducing cognitive dissonance following
from evading taxes. Depending on how susceptible to dissonance he is (i.e. depending on
the value of a), the level of tax evasion may be substantially below the level predicted by
the portfolio-choice model. In both (17b) and (17c), a rise of the conscience parameter
a will always lead to a decline of taxes evaded, and a decline of a will conversely lead




1−p+ab with t∗ ≤ 1. In other words: With b → 0, ¯ t rises.
10. For the remainder of this section, we will restrict our attention to this case where t > ¯ t, i.e. where
the taxpayer evades taxes.
14to a rise of τ. This inﬂuence, however, ceases to matter when the legitimacy of the
government’s policy is completely deteriorated, so that L = 0. In (17c), we see that
legitimacy deteriorates faster, the higher the value b, i.e., the greater the importance
attached to this matter by the individuals. With a completely illegitimate policy and
L = 0, we are back in the pure portfolio-choice model in (17d), with moral scruples and
legitimacy having disappeared simultaneously. With b → ∞, we enter the pure portfolio-
choice model immediately after t∗ is violated, but with b → 0, the government can deviate
from t∗ as far as it desires without doing serious harm to the taxpayer’s scruples depicted
by a. Summing up, we can state
Proposition 6. The stronger the taxpayer’s interest b in the informal institution violated
by the government is, the better he can utilise this violation to reduce cognitive dissonance
by justifying his evasion of taxes, and the stronger is the rise of τ resulting from a given
deviation from the informal rule. Also, the higher b, the more quickly deteriorates the
legitimacy of the government’s policy.
5. Politico-economic implications
5.1. Taming a Leviathan while suﬀering from dissonance. Assuming that the
government of our model economy is a revenue maximiser like the Leviathan modelled
for instance by Brennan/Buchanan (1980), we will have to draw our attention to the
relationship between the nominal tax rate chosen and the revenue generated by this tax
rate. Let R denote the portion of gross income appropriated by the government via the
tax system. Also, let t• be the tax rate for which τ(t•) = 1. In our model, the expected





(1 − (1 − p)τ)t + pατ1.5 ∀t < t•
(1 − (1 − p)t) + pα ∀t ≥ t•
, (18a-b)
i.e., E[R] is equal to the statutory due amount, from which the successfully evaded taxes
are to be substracted and to which the revenue from the penalty tax on detected hidden
income is to be added. The objective of a self-interested Leviathan whose only policy




Now it can be quite easily shown that, if we calculate τ within the pure portfolio-choice
model, E[R] is rising strictly monotonously in t with t ∈ [0,1]. From (5), we have
t• =
1.5pα
1−p . The f.o.c. for a maximum of (18a) with (5) substituted in for τ is given by
1 −
(1 − p)3t2
2.25p2α2 = 0 (20)




(1 − p)1.5. (21)
For p < 1, however, it is always true that tR > t•, so that tR is beyond the range of (18a).
Intuitively speaking, we would reach this maximum only if the taxpayers were able to
evade more than their gross income. (18b), on the other hand, is obviously linearly
upward sloping in t. Even with τ = 1, additional revenue is still generated with a rise of t
due to rising revenue from detected evaders. For a rational Leviathan, it would therefore
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Figure 3: Revenue generated with diﬀerent evasion patterns.
16The picture is a bit more complicated if we allow for cognitive dissonance to occur.
First of all, in (17) we saw that the higher the value of b, the faster the taxpayer’s
transition to the portfolio-choice model following from a deviation from t∗ is completed.
The importance of this eﬀect becomes visible when comparing Fig. 3a and 3c, which
appear to be completely similar with the only diﬀerence being the higher value of b in
Fig. 3c. As a result of the considerable weight attached to the policy matter in Fig. 3c,
even a very little transgression of the informal rule leads to a complete deterioration of
legitimacy. A sudden switch to the portfolio-choice regime occurs at t = t∗. Associated
with this switch is a global maximum in Fig. 3c, but only a local maximum in Fig. 3b. The
reason is the diﬀerence in a: In Fig. 3c with a = 0.5, a legitimate policy generates higher
revenue than in Fig. 3b with a = 0.1. This is also the only reason for the existence of
local and global maxima where, in the pure portfolio-choice model, we have no maximum:
the eﬀective tax rates are closer to the nominal tax rates as long as the tax payer has
to cope with a bad conscience, i.e., as long as aL assumes a positive value. With t > t∗
and a high value of b, his conscience suddenly ceases to matter and we are back in our
yardstick model of Section 3.
The simulations in Fig. 3a and Fig. 3d show that with lower values of b and moderate or
high values of a there is still a global maximum, but larger deviations from t∗ are required
to reach L = 0. If the interest in tax policy is comparatively low, then the legitimacy of
a policy deteriorates more slowly with t rising over t∗, and the issue serves less well to
vindicate tax evasion and reduce dissonance costs. Leviathan, therefore, has more leeway
to expand his budget than he has when b assumes a comparatively high value. Summing
up, we can, somewhat surprisingly, state
Proposition 7. With a rational Leviathan, tax evasion does exert a control function with
respect to the choice of the nominal tax rate only if the representative taxpayer suﬀers
from cognitive dissonance, i.e., if he has a suﬃciently high value of a. Also, tax evasion
controls the choice of t more precisely if b takes a high value.
Obviously, these results only hold if the tax rate is the only instrument available to the
revenue-maximising government. This his not entirely unrealistic, however, since it may
17often not be politically viable to change p or α in the short run. In this sense, tax
evasion controls self-interested governments in the short run, within given institutional
constraints.
5.2. Implications for the politico-economic process. So far, we have taken the
parameters newly introduced to this model, t∗, a and b, as given. These parameters,
however, will also depend on various inﬂuences, some of them related to the politico-
economic process. In fact, neither t∗ nor the other parameters can be simply set or chosen
by some agent in the model, but they are the result of public discussion of political ends
and means, of political climate and culture. For example, the informal institution, in this
case the rule that government ought to choose a tax rate t ≤ t∗, may in principle depend
on a great number of inﬂuences: Consider, for instance, the case that there is a given
demand for a minimum level of public goods that the individuals expect to be provided.
For illustrative purposes, think of a given level of social security that is considered to be
an absolute necessity. The value of t∗ will then depend on the government’s endowment
with resources that the individuals assume to be necessary to provide this level of public
goods.
If we assume, in concordance with approaches that model the relationship between cit-
izen and government as a principal-agent relationship, that the individual taxpayer has
no precise knowledge of the government’s production function for the public good, then
the determination of t∗ is not a trivial problem. In the process of ﬁnding a t∗ that is
widely accepted among individuals, there will be not only conﬂicts of interest – the type
of conﬂict public choice usually deals with – but also conﬂicts among diﬀerent theories
about the true properties of the production function.11 From this point of view, which
has already for some time been taken by heterodox approaches such as Meier/Durrer
(1992), it would be interesting to investigate whether any particular institutional set-
ting, such as competitive federalism, can be expected to enhance the rationality of the
politico-economic process by fostering the formation of a more rational (in the sense of:
11. It is also quite probable that conﬂicts of interest and theory may be intertwined in the sense that an
agent with a speciﬁc interest has an incentive to put forward a speciﬁc theory which suits his interest.
18more closely in accordance with the true properties of the economy) estimation of the t∗
necessary to provide the desired bundle of public goods.
Similarly, a and b cannot be simply decreed by the government or any other agent in the
model, but will depend on both the institutional environment and on particular attributes
of the politico-economic process. For example, the conjecture of Pommerehne et al.
(1997) that taxpayers feel more obliged to be honest when they participate in decision-
making via direct democracy, may be ﬁtted into the model presented here by assuming
that a rises with the degree of participation. On the other hand, a may decline in the
long run when a political climate evolves where individuals feel completely detached from
policy decisions (or put diﬀerently: where politics has no appeal to the polity). The value
of a may rise if public funds are needed for relief in a state of emergency and return to its
earlier level when the emergency is overcome. Finally, the value of b may be particularly
vulnerable to the rhetoric of the political process. For example, a simple informal rule
calling for t ≤ 0.5 may be charged with an incredible normative appeal by stating that
at least half of a citizen’s honestly earned income should be at his own disposal. The
weight that an individual attaches to a particular policy matter is not simply given, but
it can be raised or diluted by political rhetoric.
6. Conclusions
Taking the above examples into consideration, it should become clear that the approach
proposed here is intended as a bridge over the gap between the standard, pure portfolio-
choice approach to tax evasion and the corresponding approaches from the realm of eco-
nomic psychology. By opening the former model for the concept of cognitive dissonance,
inﬂuences that are traditionally accounted for within the latter approaches, can be also
considered within a model determining the individual’s optimal rate of tax evasion in a
rather conventional marginalist framework.
Obviously, the tax system in our model is largely simpliﬁed and it may be a worthwhile
eﬀort to extend this framework to a more realistic modelling of tax systems. In this pa-
per, however, the main purpose was to show that the introduction of dissonance costs is
19practicable and does yield sensible results open to empirical testing, be it in an experi-
mental setting or by combining survey data with data about actual tax evasion.
Finally, we hinted at the fact that the explanation of the formation of informal in-
stitutions, of the importance attached to them by the taxpayer and of the individual
susceptibility to cognitive dissonance probably call for more interdisciplinary research,
taking into consideration the institutional framework as well as elements of the politico-
economic process that so far are more or less neglected by economic approaches, such as
conﬂicts of theory and political rhetoric.
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